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Especially in the short-term, prices in natural gas markets are not exclusively determined by
overall supply and demand, but also by the availability of the transport infrastructure. If trans-
portation capacity is scarce, prices may form in (local) residual markets and can dier regionally.
If available, storages provide intertemporal arbitrage possibilities which also impact prices. Tem-
poral and regional price dierences, in turn, determine the value of storage and transport capacity
if either one is scarce. This paper applies an analytical framework for a simple pipeline grid with
a storage over two periods to illustrate the interdependencies between prices, scarce capacity and
capacity value. The theoretically optimal transportation and storage taris are described analyti-
cally. The optimal pipeline investment size is shown to be related to marginal storage investment
and a function of the discounted and aggregated cost of congestion over the lifetime's asset.
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Competitive price formation in natural gas markets is just a recent phenomenon in
many continental European countries. In many non-OECD countries, it does not yet
exist.
The United States and the UK, which witnessed the liberalization of their gas mar-
kets earlier than continental Europe, have competitive markets. Nevertheless, the
literature on price formation, the economic valuation of transport and storage capac-
ity, and the value of system bottlenecks - which regards those factors simultaneously
- is limited. While there are sophisticated investigations of each issue on its own1, an
encompassing microeconomic perspective is missing. A comprehensive and inclusive
understanding of the dynamics between commodity and capacity prices is, however, of
outmost importance for regulators, policy makers and practitioners. Due to Europe's
pipeline grid being much more integrated and cross-linked than the North American
one and signicantly larger than the British one - with only one TSO and one price
zone - this may be more relevant in Europe than in the other liberalized markets.
The application of the broader economic literature of the aforementioned issues
delivers only partial insights. Natural gas being a network-bound industry, prices in
the short-term are to a certain extent not determined by total supply and demand
but by residual supply and demand in regionally conned markets. Hence, prices for
the homogeneous good might dier regionally, not only due to transport costs but
also due to transport restrictions. Transportation itself is in most of the literature
considered a natural monopoly with prices set by regulators. Furthermore, compared to
other grid-bound commodities, most notably electricity, natural gas can economically
be stored over time in large quantities. Therefore, other than in the literature on
electricity markets, an intertemporal view is required to understand prices and the
value of capacities.
The contribution of this paper is to consolidate the explanation of prices and the
value of storage and transportation by deriving an analytical framework which allows
us to do so in an encompassing manner. Therefore, an existing microeconomic model
with perfect foresight by Cremer et al. (2003) is extended to include storages and
intertemporality in a pipeline transmission system. The framework will allow analyses
of the impact of constraints in the infrastructure system on gas prices in downstream
markets, the valuation of transmission and storage capacity, and optimal investment
in both storage and pipeline capacity from a theoretical point of view.
The microeconomic model is presented in Section 3; its implications for optimal
transport and storage taris and investments are discussed Sections 4 and 5. Section 2
gives an introduction to price formation in gas markets and its relevance for capacity
1See for example Chaton et al. (2008) on natural gas storage, Cremer and Laont (2002) and Cremer et al. (2003)
on regional prices and pipeline capacity valuation.
1valuation; Section 6 oers a summary and some concluding remarks.2
2 Price determinants in gas markets
Generally, prices in natural gas markets respond to the same dynamics as prices in all
other markets and are therefore a function of supply and demand - with the exception
that the specic characteristics of network-bound commodities, the supply infrastruc-
ture and its availability, have to be taken into account.
This is thereby especially relevant in the short-term: infrastructure capacities are
set and cannot be changed quickly and demand and supply are much less elastic than
in the long-run. Hence, while infrastructure bottlenecks can be eliminated in the long-
term and are therefore less relevant for price formation than the overall supply and
demand situation3, this is not true in the short-term. When the infrastructure is
xed, prices in a competitive market might dier regionally as the scarce transport
infrastructure can constitute a physical impediment which limits trade.4 Hence, due to
the costly and limited infrastructure (pipeline grid), supply and demand might dier
between geographically separated locations. In the theoretic modeling framework, these
locations, which are connected by potentially scarce infrastructure, will be referred to
as nodes. For illustrative purposes, we think of them as regionally separated upstream
and downstream markets in this section.
In such a separated downstream market, supply encompasses all available gas vol-
umes in the respective market including local production, supply from past time periods
(presuming there are downstream storages and gas was previously stocked there) and
potential transports to the market from all other natural gas sources on all available
routes. Accordingly, the demand curve in the market is made up by present con-
sumption (with the marginal willingness to pay diering between consumers), future
consumption (for which gas can be injected into local storages) and potential demand
from other markets (for example due to higher prices there) provided there is transport
capacity available to get the gas to the alternative market.
If transport infrastructure availability (at any given moment in time) is not an issue,
all gas sources can supply all downstream markets and all consumers can obtain gas
from all sources. Hence, arbitrage should cause prices to equalize regionally apart
from dierences in transport costs. Scarcity of capacity, on the other hand, may cause
the residual supply and demand functions in the separate markets to dier resulting
in dierent prices. The dierence between prices is the price of congestion and the
economic value of transmission assets between the respective markets.
2Appendix A briey introduces the Tiger Natural Gas Markt Model (by EWI) which can be applied to simulate
locational marginal costs in the European downstream market. Furthermore, the implications of the conclusions from
this paper for practitioners are outlined.
3See Stern (2007).
4See Stoft (2002), Chapter 5, for a similar elaboration on electricity markets.
2Similarly, storage capacity (in a local market) can be thought of as transport capac-
ity between temporally separated markets. The same logic applies: If storage capacity
is unlimited, arbitrage over time is possible and price dierences should not exceed
variable storage costs.5 Without storages, price formation between time periods is
independent from each other.
Figure 1: Regional North American natural gas prices in 2007
Source: Natural Resources Canada
The North American gas market provides an illustrative example of diering prices
between dierent regional markets (see Figure 1 which shows average 2007 market
prices for six regions in the US and Canadian border prices)6. Generally, it can be
observed that gas prices are lower in and closer to the production regions in Canada,
the Gulf and the Western states of New Mexico, Wyoming and Idaho (with the latter
seeing the overall lowest prices). The overall highest price is observed in New England
(Boston) which is the downstream market furthest away from any source of production.
5In a microeconomic analytical framework with perfect foresight, such as the one presented in this paper.
6Source: Natural Resources Canada (http://www.nrcan-rncan.gc.ca/eneene//////pdf/revrev-eng.pdf).
3Both ndings may result from transport costs and are not surprising themselves.
Furthermore, Figure 1 also reveals the importance of infrastructure availability on
prices and the impact of prices on the value of infrastructure. Similar average prices
between Louisiana (Henry Hub NYMEX) and Chicago indicate that, on average, ad-
ditional infrastructure between the two markets is not of great economic value. Be-
tween Chicago and Wyoming (Opal eld), on the other hand, prices dier by almost
3 $/MMBtu or three times estimated transport costs7. Hence, additional capacity
between those two markets would allow additional trade. Whether such additional
capacity is ecient is, however, not clear as that largely depends on whether or not
the welfare gains from trade oset the capacity costs of the additional pipeline infras-
tructure over its lifetime (and the associated variable transport costs).
Hence, while infrastructure restrictions can cause prices to dier regionally in com-
petitive gas markets, this is not necessarily inecient (see also Section 5).8
3 Analytical Framework
This section develops a simple gas ow network and storage model. The model consists
of two upstream and one downstream markets represented by three nodes (number 1,
2 and 3). Hence, two nodes are sources of gas with supply qi (i81;2) and one is a gas
sink with demand d3. Three pipelines connect the three nodes as illustrated in Figure
2. Pipelines from 2 to 1 (#21) and 1 to 3 (#13) have no capacity restriction, the
maximum capacity of the line from 2 to 3 (#23) is K. This network is, hence similar,
to Cremer et al. (2003). Other than Cremer et al. (2003), we explicitly consider storage.
Therefore, we introduce a second time period and a downstream storage.
The costs of pipeline transmission for one unit of gas along one unit of length is cij
for a ow from i to j. At nodes 1 and 2, gas is produced by independent (vertically from
the transmission system unbundled) producers at costs of Ci(qt
i) for nodes i = 1;2 and
time t = 0;1. Demand is inelastic at dt
3 for t = 0;1. These assumptions may represent
an accurate framework for short-term considerations in competitive gas markets. Even
in Europe, where upstream competition is limited due to the small number of regionally
separated suppliers, a large majority of supply contracts at the well-head (or the border
where the gas enters the European Union) have their prices indexed to commodities
other than natural gas (e.g. crude oil, fuel oil, coal, ...). Hence, the supply price is
somewhat xed and may deter suppliers from Cournot behaviour in the short-term9,
which is a sucient precondition for our model.
On the storage side, we regard only one gas storage in the downstream market which
7Based on OME (2001), we estimate transport costs over such a distance to be roughly 1.05 $/MMBtu.
8In the aforementioned example, the market decided that it may be ecient (and protable) to invest in additional
infrastructure. The Rockies Express Pipeline from Colorado and Wyoming to Illinois and Ohio was completed in 2009
(http://www.rexpipeline.com). Early observations indicate a signicantly decreasing price spread between the markets.
9A discussion on price indexation in this context can be obtained in Breton and Kharbach (2009).
4Figure 2: Extended gasow network
is presumed to be used in a welfare-maximizing way. We denote the per-unit variable
costs of the storage (which incur in the period when gas is injected into the storage) with
cstorage and a working gas volume constraint of V . The variable for the amount of gas
injected into the storage is denoted as s3. For simplicity, we assume that period t = 0 is
the o-peak period (summer) and 1 is the peak period (winter). The duration of each
period can be incorporated with a proportion factor along the line of Gravelle (1976)
with ! and (1   !) being the durations of the o-peak and peak periods respectively.
However, to keep the model discrete, we simplify to ! = (1   !) = 0:5 which allows
us to subtract from period duration altogether. We will introduce a duration factor in
a simplied form in Section 5 as period duration becomes important with respect to
investment costs.
Firstly, we study the rst-best dispatch of natural gas, as done by a benevolent
social planner, taken pipeline and storage capacity as given. The planer maximizes






















































 cstorage(s3)   G   H
with G and H representing the (annualized) capital costs for pipelines and storages re-
spectively. S(dt
3) represents gross consumer surplus at node 3 and Ci(qt
i) the production
function (technology) at node i.10
10Notation is, hence, analogue to Cremer et al. (2003) apart from introduced time indices and the storage variables.
5As the in- and outows of each node have to be balanced in each period, we can
replace the produced and consumed quantities at the nodes as follows (with zij being





























This allows us to optimize over the dispatch variables zt
ij 8 ij = 21;23;13; t = 0;1 and




























































23) + (V   s3)
where t is the Lagrange multiplier for the transmission capacity constraint in periods
t = 0;1 and  is the Lagrange multiplier for the storage capacity constraint.
As we assume perfect competition in the upstream (rms supply at marginal cost)
and downstream market (price equals marginal gross consumer surplus), we can rewrite
the derivatives of the production functions and the gross consumer surplus with the




2 , S0t(d3) = pt
3(d3)





































































3    = 0 (9)
K   z
0
23 = 0 (10)
K   z
1
23 = 0 (11)
V   s3 = 0 (12)
Regionally diertiated prices, as discussed previously, can easily be established by









i.e. the price at the downstream node exceeds the price at the upstream node by
variable transport costs c0
23l23 if the pipeline is not congested (0 = 0). If congestion
exists, the price at node 3 will increase by the shadow cost of the constraint 0. In our
framework (see next section), 0 = c0
13l13 + c0
21l21   c0
23l23 (equation 19). Hence, in the
case of congestion on pipeline #23, the price p0
3 will increase to the supply cost of the










As the competitive producer price p0
2 is assumed to remain constant, the price





Generally, such increasing regional price dierences (in excess of marginal costs
transport costs), hence, imply some form of transport infrastructure bottleneck, in
this case on pipeline #23. It is, however, important to stress that an infrastructure
bottleneck is not necessarily inecient (see further discussion in Section 5 on optimal
investment).
Temporal price relationships are similarly evident from equation (9). If the storage
capacity restriction is not binding,
p
1









i.e. the price in t = 1 equals the price in t = 0 plus the storage and interest costs. Sim-
ilarly to regional price dierences, a binding storage constraint impacts the temporal
price relationship (see next section).
74 First-best transport and storage taris
Based on the rst order conditions in equations (3) to (3), which are consistent with
xed upstream prices, a competitive downstream market and a regulated transporta-
tion infrastructure, we can also derive the optimal transport and storage charges, which
imply the economic value of the marginal capacity unit of the transmission and storage
asset respectively.
Optimal transmission tari
The value of providing the service of transporting a good from A to B is represented
by the dierence in the value of the good between B and A. In an ecient market
without trade restrictions and transport costs, arbitrage would lead prices to equalize
in all markets. With transport cost and trade restrictions, this is not necessarily the
case and prices may dier (see Section 2). Hence, transporting the good from B to A
adds p(B)   p(A) to its value. Theoretically, the transport service should, hence, be
optimally priced at its value which equals the price dierence.
This can easily be derived from our simple model. As shown by Cremer et al.
(2003), rearranging the rst order conditions for the o-peak period transport variables
(equations 3 to 9) for the price dierence between nodes yields that these are a function
of variable costs, plus potentially the shadow costs of the pipeline capacity constraint























(Results are symmetrically for the second period.)
The shadow cost of the capacity restriction can be obtained by subtracting equation









Hence, the shadow costs for the capacity constrained of pipeline #23 are the extra
costs incurred by using the dearer, unconstrained route via pipelines #21 and #13.
More generally, as long as physical transport capacity between two locations is avail-
able, the dearest used route determines the price dierence and, thus, the value of
transportation on all routes. Introducing temporality and storage complicates this
picture and exceeds the work by Cremer et al. (2003).
8Optimal storage tari
In order to assess the shadow cost of the storage constraint, storage needs to have a
positive value as it would not be used otherwise.11 Generally, such a positive value can
for example be the result of higher marginal production costs (for higher production
volumes) or a higher willingness to pay in the peak period. The same eects can,
however, be shown by including the simple assumption that the pipeline constraint is
binding in the peak-period. In the European gas market, this can be thought of as the
consequence of higher winter demand which, despite possibly constant import prices,
drives up prices as congestion on pipelines increases.
Therefore, suppose the pipeline capacity constraint is binding in period 1 but not




























1(1 + i) (22)




































Assuming competitive market structures pt
2 (for t = 0;1) will equal marginal costs
at node 2. Further assuming constant marginal costs and the absence of a production
capacity constraint and constant returns to scale production functions, p1
2 = p0
2 = p2
















Thus, the shadow cost of the storage constraint equals the increase in transport
costs for using the more expansive unconstrained route in period 1 minus the cost of
using the less expensive route in the earlier period, the subsequent storing of the gas
and the foregone interest associated with the earlier purchasing of the gas.
11In this case, storage can be thought of a transportation asset to supply gas from one time period to another. Without
scarcity and storage costs, intertemporal arbitrage would, theoretically, lead to identical prices in both periods.
12pt
38t = 0;1 could also be expressed in other terms in our framework. We analyse this case as it more interesting
since it will combine the storage and pipeline capacity shadow costs.
9The optimal storage tari can then be expressed as the dierence between prices at







3 =  + c
0
storage (24)
Trivially, we nd that the equilibrium storage charge equals the marginal cost of
storing gas if the storage volume constraint is not binding ( = 0).





















I.e. the storage charge equals the cost increase in period 1 arising from using the more
expansive transmission lines due to constrained storage and congested transmission
line #23 in that period.
Substituting 1 from (20), the shadow cost of the storage constraint  from equation










Thus, the shadow cost of storage capacity can also be expressed as the dierence of
the shadow cost of the transmission capacity constraint in period 1 (in period 0 terms)
less the marginal storage costs less the foregone interest credit as a results of incurring
the purchasing and transport costs in period 0 instead of in period 1 (when storing the
gas).
Substituting into the optimal storage charge we nd that it should equal the shadow














Optimal transmission tari in the presence of storage
We now again turn to the optimal transmission tari to investigate how it is inuenced
by storage capacity. As discussed before, the optimal transmission charges f can be
expressed as the dierences in prices between the respective nodes. From equations (3)






























10Due to pipelines #21 and #13 being unconstrained, their optimal tari is given by
the respective marginal costs. The constrained pipeline's (#23) optimal charge depends
on the shadow cost of the congestion. To look at the impact of storage capacity, we
again assume the constraint to be only binding in the peak period, i.e. 0 = 0. To
obtain 1 we rearrange (26):



















23l23 + (1 + i) + (1 + i)c
0














If the storage is not constrained ( = 0), in optimum transmission on #23 should be
charged at the marginal cost of storing plus the transport costs on the less expensive
route in the o-peak period and plus the foregone interest by purchasing the gas in the
earlier period (all in period 1 terms). Hence, the presence of (unconstrained) storage
and an unconstrained transport route in an earlier period put an upper bound on the
tari for the congested pipeline in the peak period.
If  > 0, then substituting from (23) yields the intuitive result that the transmission
tari for #23 in period 1 also has to equal the costs of the alternative unconstrained
transport route (because using that route is always an alternative to storage and can
therefore not be cheaper in order for storage to be viable):
f
1






























Hence, vice versa to the previous observation, the costs of the alternative transport
route constitute an upper limit on storage costs. As the next section demonstrates, in
equilibrium the marginal costs of the alternatives (storage or using the dearer transport
route) will be identical.
115 Optimal storage and pipeline capacity investment
We now introduce capacity investments into the social welfare optimization problem
(equation 1). Therefore, the pipeline xed costs H are replaced by CP(K)=N and
storage xed costs G by CS(V )=N where N denotes the number of o-peak periods
the capacity can be used for (economic lifetime)13. Thus, CP(K)=N and CS(V )=N can
be interpreted as the per-peak-and-o-peak-period (annualized) costs for pipeline and
storage capacity respectively. For better understanding, they shall simply be referred
to as annual capacity costs subsequently.
Furthermore, we introduce period duration within the year wt for periods t = 0;1.
For simplicity, we denote the duration of the o-peak period with w; (1   w) is the
duration of the peak period.
This will change the FOCs for s3 (equation 9), 0 (equation 10), 1 (equation 11)












3   w = 0 (34)
@L
@0 = CP(K)=N   wz
0
23 = 0 (35)
@L
@1 = CP(K)=N   (1   w)z
1
23 = 0 (36)
@L
@















Storage vs. Pipeline Investment
With the no-pipeline-congestion assumption for the o-peak period holding, i.e. 0 = 0,
we substitute @L
@K and @L
















Thus, in optimum, the per-period marginal capacity cost for pipeline equals the
per-period marginal capacity cost for storage plus the extra costs incurred for storage
(which are the marginal cost of storing one unit plus the foregone interest credit by
purchasing and transporting this one unit of gas in the earlier o-peak period).
Hence, marginal annual pipeline and storage capacity costs are not equal in equilib-
rium but the former exceeds the latter by the extra cost incurred due to storing natural
13Please note from equation (2) that capital costs incur only once every two periods, i.e. only once for peak and
o-peak period. Thinking of t = 0;1 as summer and winter, N would thus be a year.
12gas.14
Optimal investment level
For the optimal tari on the congested pipeline (in period 1 terms), that would mean














(1 + i) (41)
Hence, as the pipeline is only congested in the peak period, the marginal capital costs
are only borne by peak usage through an increase in the tari by 1=(1 w) accounting
for the duration of the period. (The tari, thus, decreases with a longer peak period
1   w).
The absolute levels of pipeline investment on the congested route are determined by
equation 38. Substituting from the shadow costs of the pipeline constraints in periods




















If 0 = 0, as assumed earlier, the marginal capacity cost of the pipeline would in
equilibrium equal the shadow cost of the constraint in the peak period (only).















t wt = 1 and t = 0;1;:::;N and N being the lifetime of the investment.
I.e. in a world with continuous (non-discrete) investment decisions, the marginal
capital cost of the investment has to equal the discounted congestion costs over the
lifetime of the asset.
6 Summary and Conclusions
The simplied gas ow model in this paper was based on a theoretical framework with
perfect competition and perfect foresight. While regulators may be able to ensure
workable competition in downstream markets, the latter is only present in economic
theory.
Nevertheless, the ndings bear some implications for prices, capacity valuation and
investments in gas markets.
14These extra costs are weighted with w. The terms for CP0(V )=N and CP0(K)=N are weighted with the intra-year
duration as the relative benets of both incur in the same period within the year.
15Marginal capacity cost is multiplied by (1 + i) as it is incurred in period 0.
13The model demonstrated that natural gas prices are in the short term signicantly
impacted by the availability of the transmission and storage infrastructure. Apart from
commodity costs, location-specic supply costs are also aected by variable transport
and storage costs. Consequently, the marginal cost of supply might be dierent for
each point in the system (node), which could lead to dierent prices at each node. In
a physically fully integrated market, the price dierence between two points would not
exceed the variable transport cost between these two points (for storages: the temporal
price dierence would not exceed variable storage costs).
However, if either transport or storage capacity is scarce, the regional or temporal
price dierence might exceed variable transport or storage costs.
The economic value of transmission or storage, thereby, equals the respective re-
gional or temporal price dierence - and taris in a theoretical optimum should reect
this value.
With respect to absolute investment sizes, the expected result, that the marginal
capacity cost should equal the shadow cost of the capacity constraint, is also obtained
in a simple network. Hence, a price dierence in excess of variable costs, and therefore
some form of bottleneck, is actually ecient if the marginal cost of additional capacity
would exceed the aggregated discounted shadow cost of the constraint over the lifetime
of the asset.
As storage and pipeline capacity impact prices and, thus, the shadow costs of
the constraints, optimal investments in both are inextricably related to each other.
Marginal capacity costs for storage and transmission are, thereby, not equal in equilib-
rium as gas storage bears additional costs which reduce its marginal capacity cost in
the equilibrium condition relative to marginal pipeline capacity cost.
These ndings with respect to absolute and relative investment have important
implications for policymakers and regulators: Firstly, while a bottleneck may hamper
competition and limit physical market integration, it is not necessarily ecient from
an economic point of view to eliminate each bottleneck as the costs of the required
investments might exceed the cost of the restriction. Secondly, a seasonal bottleneck
in transportation might not be most eciently removed by investment in transport
capacity; it might be more ecient to invest in storage instead. The same can be true
the other way around.
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15Appendix
A Nodal Prices in the EWI TIGER Infrastructure Model of
the European Gas Market
Recognizing the importance of interdependencies within the European natural gas in-
frastructure with respect to the evaluation of new investment projects, physical market
integration, and security of supply, the Institute for Energy Economics at the Univer-
sity of Cologne (EWI) developed the Tiger natural gas infrastructure model, which
is linked to a database of the European gas market infrastructure containing all high-
pressure long-distance transmission pipelines and all natural gas storages.
Apart from taking into account other gas-market characteristics, which were omit-
ted in the theoretical considerations in this paper (LNG imports as a source of gas,
production capacities and exibilities), Tiger is, hence, a larger and sophisticated
version of a gas ow model as shown in Figure 2 on page 5.16 An illustration of the
Tiger gas ow model including all pipelines and storages is depicted in Figure 3.17
Figure 3: EWI Tiger Gas Flow Model
Source: EWI, illustration including selected pipeline and storage projects
16A detailed description of the model and the database can be obtained in form of a model description on EWI's
webpage (www.ewi.uni-koeln.de) or by request from the author of this paper.
17Nodes are omitted in the map for illustrative purposes but are located at each interception of pipelines and at
locations of supply, demand and storages.
16As the Tiger model can be applied with respect to the identication and economic
valuation of bottlenecks and the determination of location-specic marginal costs, Ap-
pendix A.2 discusses the estimation of nodal prices with the model and the application
of the conclusions from the theoretical part of this paper. Section A.1 presents the
model mathematically.
A.1 Model Formulation
The model is a linear optimization model minimizing the total cost of gas supply in
the European gas market taking into account the relevant technical constraints of the
infrastructure and assuming an ecient utilization of infrastructure assets (i.e. eective
regulation of the natural monopoly pipeline infrastructure and either a competitive
storage market or its eective regulation18).
On the upstream side, it is assumed that gas is sold at price-inelastic commodity
costs which is compatible with the assumptions of the theoretical model.19 With respect
to demand, the model does not incorporate a price elasticity in the short-term apart
from an innitely high threshold price above which consumers are assumed to reduce
consumption.20
Hence, the objective function minimizes full commodity plus all variable costs in-





















for all nodes i, all pipelines from nodes i to j, the respective storages and LNG terminals
located at nodes i and all time periods t. Time periods t can, thereby, dier in length
depending on the conguration of the model but are usually either one day or one
month.
The optimization of this objective function is subject to a number of technical
restrictions arising from production, transport pipelines, storages and LNG terminals.
18Depending on whether storage is regulated or not. The same holds true for LNG import facilities.
19Prices for short-term LNG cargos are presumed to form in the global market with Europe being a price-taker;
commodity prices in long-term import contracts are supposed to be xed by price-indexation to substitutes and therefore
not a function of gas market supply and demand.
20This price is chosen to be so high that it only becomes relevant when supply costs rise to innity, which is the case
only when demand can no longer be met due to restrictions on the upstream or infrastructure side.
17Production is aggregated to production regions but assigned for individual nodes.
Both have to adhere to the following constraints (only depicted for nodes for simplicity):
Supplyt;i  PeakSupplyCapacityt;i X
t2year
Supplyt;i  AnnualSupplyCapacityyear;i
The only restriction for transport pipelines is its capacity (which depends on t as it
may change over time):
Flowt;i;j  PipelineCapacityt;i;j
For all combinations of nodes i;j where there is no pipeline, PipelineCapacityi;j is
zero implying that the ow on the pipeline has to be zero, too. Pipeline directionality
is taken into account by dierentiating between capacities between i and j and between
j and i.
Storages are constrained by a working gas volume (WGV) and maximum injection
and withdrawal rates which are a function of the current storage level (as they change
with the pressure inside the storage). Furthermore, storages need to adhere to a balance
constraint ensuring that injections and withdrawals (and the resulting storage level)






Similar to production facilities, LNG import terminals are subject to maximum
output rates and annual nominal import capacities (LNG storages are included in the
same fashion as regular natural gas storages):
LNGImportst;i  PeakRegasicationCapacityt;i X
t2year
LNGImportst;i  AnnualImportCapacityyear;i
In addition to all those technical constraints, an energy balance constraint ensures
that the market clears. For all nodes n and time periods t it needs to be true that the








Flowt;i;j + StorageInjectionst;i + DEMANDt;i   DemandReductiont;i
18As this condition needs to be true for all nodes i and all time periods t, it also
ensures that the system as a whole is in equilibrium in each time period and over time.
Formulating the Lagrangian of the optimization problem and solving the prob-
lem would not only provide results for all optimization variables Supplyt;i, Flowt;j;i,
LNGImportst;i, StorageLevelt;i, DemandReductiont;i, StorageInjectionst;i and Stor-
ageWithdrawalst;i, but also allows an interpretation of the shadow costs (Lagrange
multipliers) of the restrictions.
The shadow cost of the energy balance constraint, thereby, indicate the total system
cost of supplying one additional unit of gas at the respective node and the respective
time. These can, hence, be interpreted as location- and time specic marginal costs,
which constitute nodal prices in a competitive market.
A.2 Modeled Locational Marginal Costs and their Implications
These nodal prices are notionally equivalent to the market prices at the dierent nodes
which were derived in Section 3 of this paper.
The energy balance constraint of the model highlights the importance of infrastruc-
ture for short-term price formation in a regionally conned market (or at a node) as,
apart from local supply and storage withdrawals, supply is largely made up by import
(inows) on pipelines. The same holds true for demand which can come in the form
of demand for exports (outows). As discussed before, if the pipeline infrastructure
is scarce, demand and supply may dier regionally and limit arbitrage opportunities.
Hence, prices may dier in excess of variable costs implying a bottleneck on a pipeline
route. (See equation (13), page 7, with 0 > 0.)21
However, as shown theoretically, a bottleneck is not necessarily inecient. As
demonstrated in Section 5 (equation (42)), if the marginal cost of the congestion
does not exceed the marginal capacity cost, having price dierences and, hence, an
infrastructure bottleneck is ecient. With discrete investment decisions (as in the re-
ality of a gas market: building a pipeline with a non-innitesimal capacity or not),
the marginal units cannot be considered and volumes have to be further taken into
account. In theory, if the investment costs of a pipeline (expansion) exceed the dis-
counted, volume-weighted shadow-costs of the capacity restriction, the investment is
not ecient.
With respect to an analysis of bottlenecks in the gas market and implications for
investment requirements, the following issues shall be noted:
1. As the Tiger Gas Flow Model does not include investments (and investment
costs), it cannot compute optimal investment decisions. The model can, however,
assist in evaluating potential investment projects. Dierences in location-specic
21This section focuses on the discussion of pipeline bottlenecks. Similarly, storage bottlenecks can be identied by
investigating temporal price dierences and variable storage costs.
19marginal costs can be used to determine the economic costs of the constraint
and the economic value of the inframarginal additional capacity unit. Comparing
these (over time aggregated and discounted) shadow costs with the capital costs
of pre-dened investment projects will allow a conclusion on whether or not it is
economically ecient to eliminate or reduce the bottleneck with the respective
project. This project may be either a storage or a pipeline.
2. Furthermore, this paper demonstrated that pipeline investments are impacted by
storage investments and vice versa. The same holds true with respect to interde-
pendencies between one pipeline asset and another. Hence, if several investments
are found to be economically viable, the simultaneous elimination of several bot-
tlenecks may not be ecient as one is not unlikely to have an impact on the
other. (One new investment might resolve more than one bottleneck.) Hence,
by including the most benecial investment project from an economic point of
view, the model can not only be applied to calculate the potential reduction of
the price dierential and the decline in total systems costs as the consequence of
the new project. In a second step, it may also be used to investigate the impact on
other bottlenecks. The evaluation and identication of any second most benecial
investment project would only start there.
3. Finally, with respect to a practical implementation, it shall further be noted that
the shadow cost computation of a constraint is associated with uncertainty re-
garding future demand and supply developments and potentially competing in-
frastructure(s). Hence, it is advisable to calculate expected shadow costs instead
by including variations of the uncertain parameters in a scenario analysis. In
the Tiger Model framework, each scenario would then be calculated separately.
The derived scenario shadow costs, weighted with the probability of the scenario,
would add up to the expected shadow costs of the constraint.
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